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Panel data for seven Latin American countries are used to assess the influence of 
public indebtedness on public investment in infrastructure in the period 1987-
2001. Debt increases are associated with higher public infrastructure investment, 
an effect that is robust to the inclusion of many other fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables. This paper also finds some evidence of complementarity between 
public and private investment and of the negative effect of IMF adjustment loans 
on infrastructure expenditures. No evidence is found that debt defaults affect 
public investment in infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction 
Since public infrastructure projects are typically large, lumpy and long-lived, they are usually 
financed with debt. In the case of Latin America, the legacy of past fiscal problems and exposure 
to major domestic and external economic shocks have made public debt restrictions a common 
phenomenon in the region, with potentially deleterious effects on the levels and costs of public 
infrastructure investment. Overindebtedness may thus create a vicious circle where the inability 
to finance new investment projects curtails the possibility of generating economic growth and 
servicing debt. This issue is of the utmost relevance in Latin America, where public debt ratios in 
the 1990s were on average around 40 percent of GDP and public investment in infrastructure 
was just 1 percent of GDP. Although the private sector invested nearly 1.1 percent of GDP in 
infrastructure during the 1990s, as Figure 1 shows, that still leaves a gap with respect to the 
requirements of investment, which have been estimated at about 4.4 percent of GDP (Fay and 
Morrison, 2005), not to mention the standards of fast-growing countries such as China, where 
investment in infrastructure averaged 6.7 percent of GDP in the 1990s and 9 percent of GDP in 
the period 1998-2002 (Naughton, 2004).  
Though a growing body of literature provides some support for these arguments, as will 
be discussed below, a central piece of this line of reasoning remains largely untested, namely the 
presumption that exogenous  increases (or decreases) in the stock of debt translate into decreases 
(or increases) in public infrastructure investment. (In this context, “exogenous” means debt 
changes that are not the result of public infrastructure investment decisions). If this presumption 
holds true, several important implications follow. First, it implies that public infrastructure 
investment (henceforth PII), is crowded out by non-infrastructure uses of public finance. Second, 
it implies that PII may be sensitive to other factors that may affect the value of the existing debt, 
such as exchange rate changes, debt relief or debt repudiation.  
But the presumption that exogenous public debt increases translate into lower PII is not 
necessarily true. The presumption may be valid if the public sector as a whole faces a single 
financial constraint, there is no important feedback from non-infrastructure expenditures into 
government revenues, and infrastructure expenditures operate as an adjustment variable to 
accommodate fiscal restrictions. When state-owned enterprises are in charge of infrastructure 
services, they may face financial constraints that may be largely (though not always) independent 
of those of the central government. But even if they face the same financial constraints, non-  5
infrastructure public expenditures financed with debt may be revenue enhancing (through their 
effect on growth or, more directly, by improving the ability of the government to collect 
revenues) and therefore need not crowd out PII. Finally, if fiscal adjustment is unavoidable, it is 
far from evident that PII is the best candidate for cuts: delays in public investment projects are 
extremely expensive and may be ruinous not only financially but also politically. 
This paper attempts to shed light on these issues by assessing how public debt affects 
public infrastructure investment with econometric evidence for seven Latin American countries 
since 1987. The main conclusion is that exogenous debt increases do not reduce PII. On the 
contrary, the further a country goes into debt, the more PII increases, even after controlling for 
the contemporaneous effect of primary expenditure increases on PII. But this also implies that 
during periods of fiscal retrenchment, PII suffers the double whammy of expenditure cuts and 
reductions in the stock of debt. The central conclusion of this paper is consistent with the finding 
in Lora and Olivera (2007) that public social expenditures are inversely associated with public 
debt. The present paper also finds that IMF lending does reduce PII, as is often said, although it 
does not alter the composition of primary expenditures. No evidence is found in support of the 
view that debt defaults may help increase PII.    
The rest of this paper is organized in four short sections. Following this introduction, a 
brief literature review is intended to put the research questions in context. Then, the econometric 
approach and data used are presented. The main section of the paper is the discussion of the 
econometric results, and a final section summarizes the conclusions and implications. 
 
2. A Brief Literature Review 
Since the 1980s, concerns about the implications of fiscal adjustments have motivated several 
studies of interest. Hicks and Kubisch (1984) noted that capital expenditures were the type of 
expenditure most exposed to cuts during periods of fiscal retrenchment over the period 1972-80, 
and Hicks (1989) confirmed this finding with a sample of 11 “high debt” countries during 1978-
84. With data for a larger number of developing countries over the period 1975-86, Heller and 
Diamond (1990) concluded that shifts in the composition of government expenditures tended to 
be most pronounced against fixed assets and capital transfers. Consistent with these studies, 
Calderón, Easterly and Servén (2003) have calculated that in five of the largest Latin American   6
countries, infrastructure investment cuts contributed half or more of the total fiscal adjustment 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  
While all the evidence points towards greater exposure of capital expenditures to fiscal 
retrenchment measures, these studies leave unclear whether this is a response to changes in debt 
ratios and/or the debt burden. Calderon, Easterly and Servén (2003) argue that the debt crisis of 
the 1980s caused a collapse in infrastructure investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, but 
no econometric test is provided to support this assertion. 
The potential effects of debt on capital investment and growth have been studied in a 
recent paper by Pattillo et al. (2004). They applied a growth-accounting framework to a group of 
61 developing countries over 1969-98 and found that doubling their average external debt level 
reduces growth of both per capita physical capital and total factor productivity by almost 1 
percentage point. In other words, large debt stocks negatively affect growth by dampening both 
physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity growth. While very illustrative, these 
simulations do not constitute evidence of the actual impact of debt on infrastructure investment 
expenditures. 
One of the few papers where the issue has been addressed econometrically is Mahdavi 
(2004), which finds support for the adverse effect of the debt burden on capital expenditure in a 
sample of 47 developing countries for 1972-2001. However, the effect is not significant for the 
Latin American sub-sample. Also, it is important to keep in mind that Mahdavi only tested for 
the effects of the debt burden, not for the possible direct influence that the levels of debt may 
have on public investment. 
A few studies on the determinants of public investment in low-income countries have 
attempted to isolate the influence of indebtedness on public capital expenditures. Using data for 
1970-99 for 55 low-income countries classified as eligible for the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, Clements et al. (2003) estimated equations to identify the key determinants of 
public investment. Among the variables considered were the stock of external debt and the debt 
service.   They concluded that the stock of external debt has no significant effect on public 
investment, as public investment seems to be driven more by the current fiscal position and the 
availability of resources than by factors that affect fiscal sustainability over the longer term. 
However, their results support the hypothesis that higher debt service (as opposed to the stock of 
external debt) crowds out public investment in a non-linear fashion, with the crowding-out effect   7
intensifying as the ratio of debt service to GDP rises. According to their estimates, on average, 
for every percentage point of GDP increase in debt service, public investment declines by about 
0.2 percentage point of GDP. As they conclude, “the modest magnitude of this decline is 
surprising, indicating that large debt burdens have not seriously hampered public investment in 
low-income countries… [and that] debt relief by itself cannot be expected to lead to large 
increases in public investment.” This conclusion is consistent with the review of studies on the 
debt-overhang hypothesis by Dijkstra and Hermes (2001), which found the empirical evidence 
on this issue to be inconclusive.  
In synthesis, while the evidence clearly indicates that capital expenditures are sensitive to 
fiscal adjustment, there is not much empirical basis to the presumed inverse link between debt or 
even the debt burden and capital expenditures. Furthermore, no study has focused on public 
infrastructure investment, PII, our main variable of interest. This is a serious deficiency, because 
capital expenditures by the central or the consolidated government as measured by the 
International Monetary Fund’s  Government Finance Statistics (the source in some of the papers 
surveyed; see Mahdavi, 2004) are a very poor measure of actual PII, which in many countries is 
mostly undertaken by state-owned enterprises or local governments whose operations are not 
well captured by this source. 
In a paper closely related to the present one, Lora and Olivera (2007) have assessed the 
effects of public debt on social expenditure worldwide.
2 Besides sharing most of its data and 
econometric methods with the present paper (see next section), that paper is worth mentioning 
because some of its findings may help to explain how PII may be affected by debt. The central 
finding of the paper is that higher public debt ratios reduce both the level and the share of social 
expenditures in primary expenditures (that is, excluding interest payments, and even after 
controlling for them). This finding indicates that debt displaces social expenditures not so much 
because it raises the debt burden, but rather because it crowds out social expenditure in favor of 
other expenditures (besides reducing room for further indebtedness).  
The present paper attempts to answer many of the same questions, namely: 
•  Is public infrastructure investment (PII, as a share of GDP and as a 
share of public primary expenditure) affected by changes in public 
debt ratios (over GDP), and in what direction? 
                                                       
2 Our definition of social expenditures comprises only public health and public education expenditures.   8
•  Is this effect related to the changes that occur in interest debt payments 
(as a share of GDP) when debt changes, or does the stock of debt have 
an effect of its own? 
•  Does it make any difference if the lender is a multilateral organization, 
such as the International Monetary Fund, or one of the multilateral 
development banks?  
•  Does a debt default lead to an increase or to a reduction in PII? 
•  And, finally, what are the policy implications of all of the above? 
 
3. Data and Econometric Approach 
Our main variable of interest, public investment in infrastructure, PII (measured as GDP-ratios) 
in the seven largest Latin American countries, has been constructed by Calderón and Servén 
(2004). They have also gathered data on private infrastructure investment, which will be of use 
for us as a control variable. Both public and private investment in infrastructure cover four types 
of capital goods: power, land transportation, water and telecommunications. As Calderón and 
Servén note, a narrow definition of PII is needed to assure comparability across countries. 
Given our dependent variable, our dataset is a panel of yearly data from 1987 to 2001 for 
seven Latin American countries.
3 Due to time sample limitations of some of the explanatory 
variables described below, the panel is unbalanced. After taking first differences in order to 
apply an Arellano and Bond estimator (see below), only a maximum of 47 observations
4 are left, 
which limits the precision of the estimates and narrows the scope for robustness exercises. With 
these caveats in mind, following is a short description of the remaining variables and the 
econometric approach.  
 Data for debt stocks, our main explanatory variable, comes from Jaimovich and Panizza 
(2006). This dataset uses information from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
complemented with data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and ECLAC. One important 
feature of the data for debt stocks is that they cover both external and domestic debt issued by 
central governments (but not by other levels of government, or by state-owned enterprises). Debt 
data are expressed as shares of GDP in nominal values (to do so, debts denominated in foreign 
                                                       
3 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
4 Distributed as follows: Argentina 7, Bolivia 6, Brazil 1, Chile 9, Colombia 3, Mexico 14, and Peru 7.   9
currencies are converted into domestic currency values using market exchange rates). Interest 
debt payments and other fiscal variables come from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics,  
except for privatization proceeds, which come from World Bank (2005). Since all these data 
come in nominal values, they are converted into GDP ratios using the nominal GDP values 
reported by the IMF’s IFS. This is also the source for other macroeconomic variables, such as the 
exchange rate and the inflation rate. Finally, the default variable (a dummy taking the value of 1 
in the years that the country is in arrears) comes from Standard & Poor’s data processed by 
Borensztein and Panizza (2006).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the econometric 
analysis and Table 2 reports pairwise correlations.  
The main concern that needs to be addressed in the estimation method is the endogeneity 
bias that would result from regressing PII directly on public debt (and other fiscal variables). The 
most convenient method for dealing with endogeneity problems in panel data is the Arellano and 
Bond estimator, which uses lagged values of the explanatory variables (in first differences) as 
instruments for those same variables. The validity of the method rests on the assumption that the 
instruments are correlated with the explanatory variables but not with the dependent variable. 
The Sargan test (which is reported in the tables) suggests no reason to suspect the validity of the 
method. However, in the first set of regressions, I also present standard ordinary least squares 
estimates that, although necessarily biased, point towards the same basic results as the Arellano 
and Bond estimator. Since the dependent variable is also converted into first differences, the 
Arellano and Bond estimator also deals with the non-stationarity problem that arises when the 
variables exhibit time trends that may lead to spurious correlations between the dependent and 
the explanatory variables. Although the Arellano and Bond estimator may still be inadequate 
when the series exhibit non-stationarity after first differentiation, the main tests (reported in 
Table 1) indicate that this is not the case with most of our dataset. 
   
4. Econometric Results 
The first set of results is presented in Table 3. All regressions control for GDP and its square (in 
logs). We start with two ordinary least-squares regressions with country-fixed effects, which 
show a striking result that will be the center of attention throughout this section, namely that PII 
increases in response to a rise of the debt-ratio. The coefficient of these first two regressions   10
indicate that PII increases around 1.3 percent points of GDP when the debt ratio (lagged one 
year) goes from 0 to 100 percent of GDP. The result is significant at 10 percent and is robust to 
the inclusion of the fiscal balance, which is not significant. Regressions 3 and 4, using the 
Arellano and Bond estimator, confirm that PII is positively associated with increases in the debt 
ratio. The inclusion of the fiscal balance reduces the value of the (short-run) coefficient from 1.6 
to 1.1 percent and lowers its significance. Taking into account the effect of the lagged dependent 
variable, the long-run coefficients become 2.9 and 1.4 percent, respectively. According to 
Regression 4, there is a highly significant negative association between the fiscal balance and 
PII, implying that PII tends to decline during periods of fiscal adjustment, as found in previous 
studies. Regressions 5 and 6 attempt to identify the channels through which this effect takes 
place. In Regression 5 the fiscal balance is broken down into primary balance and debt interest 
payments, and in Regression 6 the primary balance is broken down into primary expenditures 
and primary revenues. Surprisingly, PII seems to increase when interest payments rise, which is 
due to the effect that debt increases have on both variables. PII also responds directly to changes 
in total primary expenditures, confirming that PII is susceptible to expenditure cuts (though not 
to changes in fiscal revenues).  
In Table 4, which attempts to test whether PIIs behave like other primary expenditures, 
the dependent variable is the ratio of PII to total primary expenditures. The results clearly 
indicate that PIIs behave differently, since their relative importance increases significantly when 
debt increases or during periods of fiscal relaxation. Thus, Regressions 1 and 2 indicate that an 
increase of the stock of debt equivalent to 1 percent of GDP leads to a short-run increase of 0.18-
0.15 percent points in the share of PII in primary expenditures (or 0.3 and 0.22, respectively, in 
the long run). The second, and lower, of these coefficients comes from the regression that 
includes the fiscal balance, suggesting that part of the increase of PII comes from the relaxation 
of fiscal discipline associated with periods of debt expansion. Thus, as implied by Regression 2, 
when the fiscal balance is loosened by 1 percent of GDP, the share of PII in total primary 
expenditures increases 0.26 percent in the short run (or 0.39 in the long run). Therefore, while in 
periods of fiscal relaxation PII increases both because there is more expenditure and more 
indebtedness, in periods of fiscal restraint PII is subject to the “double whammy” of expenditure 
cuts and debt consolidation. Regressions 3 and 4 indicate that this double effect is strongly 
associated with the behavior of interest payments, not with the rest of the fiscal balance. Thus,   11
the share of primary expenditures devoted to PII tends to increase around 0.5 percent in the short 
run (or 0.66 in the long run) when debt interest payments increase by 1 percent of GDP, but that 
share does not change significantly when the primary balance weakens (or when primary 
expenditures fall or fiscal revenues increase). Of course, this pattern of behavior of PII must have 
its counterpart in some other expenditure that behaves in the opposite fashion. The results of 
Lora and Olivera (2007) suggest that public social expenditures (PSEs), play that role. In that 
paper we estimate that PSEs in Latin America decline around 0.04 percent points for each 1 
percent point increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio, with most of that decline coming from the 
negative effect of debt interest payments on PSEs. As a share of primary expenditures, PSEs fall 
in a significant way when interest payments increase in Latin America: about 0.89 percent for 
each 1 percent increase in interest payments as a share of GDP. 
Our results point towards a symbiotic relationship between PII and public debt that may 
operate in the following way. Like other primary expenditures, PII increase when fiscal 
resources grow. However, when public debt is on the rise, PII is at an advantage vis-à-vis other 
primary expenditures, possibly because infrastructure is considered a more productive type of 
expenditure than, say, social expenditure, especially in the short to medium run, and possibly 
because there are legal and institutional constraints that tie debt to physical investment projects. 
In periods of fiscal consolidation, PII is adversely impacted through the decline in expenditures 
and the reduced use of (or access to) credit. 
Table 5 presents additional regressions to test the robustness of the basic results. 
Regression 1 is the same Regression 4 of Table 3. Regressions 2 through 6 include as additional 
regressors the value of privatizations (as share of GDP) of existing infrastructure state-owned 
enterprises (Regression 2), the real exchange rate (Regression 3), the inflation rate (measured as 
loss of domestic purchasing power of the currency, Regression 4), the value of private 
infrastructure investment (as share of GDP, Regression 5), and all these additional regressors 
together (Regression 6). Only the last of these additional variables has some significance. The 
positive sign indicates that private and public investment are (contemporaneously) 
complementary (with a significance of 10 percent). Except for one regression, the influence of 
public debt on PII is positive and significant. The association between the fiscal balance and PII 
is always inverse, but it is only significant in three of the five new regressions.   12
A topic of heated debate among Latin American policymakers and international financial 
institutions such as the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank is the 
influence that the loans of these institutions have on the level and the composition of public 
expenditures. If governments have access to international capital markets, multilateral lending 
does not necessarily increase public expenditure or alter its composition, though it may of course 
improve its quality and its economic and social impact. When access to external finance is 
limited, two opposing effects may operate: on the one hand, multilateral loans may finance 
projects that could not take place otherwise, but on the other hand, governments may be forced to 
adopt fiscal adjustment measures that they would not take otherwise. As recently argued by 
representatives of several Latin American governments, the adjustment measures usually 
promoted by the IMF may be behind the decline of PII. According to some, PII should be 
considered “below the line” when used to calculate the fiscal balance targeted in the IMF-
supported adjustment programs, because PII leads to the generation of further fiscal revenues 
(for a summary of this debate see Agénor and Moreno-Dodson, 2006). 
The set of regressions in Table 6 may shed some light on this debate. Regression 1 shows 
that official lending, as a whole, has a minor and negative—though not significant—effect on 
PII. However, when official lending is broken down by type of lender, as in Regression 2, it 
becomes clear that IMF lending may indeed be associated (with a 10 percent significance) with 
lower PII, as the critics claim, while other multilateral lending may be supportive of PII, though 
the latter effect is not significant. Regressions 3 and 4 replicate the two previous regressions, but 
with PII as share of primary expenditures as the dependent variable. The only additional 
conclusion to take from these regressions is that the negative influence that the IMF may have on 
PII is shared by other expenditures; in other words, the IMF does not create a bias against (or in 
favor of) infrastructure vis-à-vis other expenditures. 
Another contentious topic in Latin America is the effect of debt defaults and 
renegotiations. Pro-defaulters argue that defaults release resources that can be reallocated to 
attend to needs that are more pressing than debt service. Opponents of default, however, argue 
that such potential benefits are easily overridden by the costs of reduced investment and 
production, and the loss of access to finance. In Lora and Olivera (2007), we have shown that 
defaults do help increase social expenditures in the short run, but the benefit is offset rapidly if 
that decision leads to a  loss of credit access. However, as shown in Lora (2007), in Latin   13
America defaults are associated with larger social expenditures only in cases of very high 
indebtedness; otherwise they lead to lower social expenditures.  Table 7 assesses whether debt 
defaults have any effect on PII. The relevant explanatory variables are a dummy (that takes the 
value of one when the government declares default)
5 and interaction terms between that dummy 
and the amounts of total public debt or total official debt (as ratios to GDP). The answer seems to 
be negative: defaults do not seem to have any effect on PII (a conclusion necessarily tentative, 
given the limitations of our dataset). This conclusion holds both when the dependent variable is 
the ratio of PII to GDP (Regressions 1 and 2) or when it is the ratio of PII to primary 
expenditures (Regressions 3 and 4). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The central conclusion of this paper is that (exogenous) debt increases (or declines) are 
associated with increases (or declines) in public infrastructure investment in seven Latin 
American countries, which runs contrary to conventional wisdom. Our estimates indicate that 
each additional dollar of debt leads to an increase of 1 cent in PII in the following year and 
around 1.4 cents in the long run. Though the effect is small, it is robust to the inclusion of the 
current fiscal balance and of many other macroeconomic variables. However, it is not robust to 
the breakdown of the fiscal balance between primary balance and interest payments because PII 
is strongly and positively  associated with debt interest payments (which are, of course, 
influenced by debt levels). PII is also strongly and positively associated with total primary 
expenditures.  
Surprising as they may look, these findings are largely consistent with previous literature. 
While no previous paper has found any direct effect of public debt on public investment or 
capital expenditures in general, the sensitivity of these variables to periods of fiscal retrenchment 
is a well-documented fact. The findings of the present paper are also consistent with the fact that 
public indebtedness has a deleterious effect on social expenditures. With respect to the influence 
of the debt service on public investment, our results contrast with previous findings.   
This paper has also found some evidence of complementarity between public and private 
investment in infrastructure and of the negative effect of IMF adjustment loans on infrastructure 
expenditures. Finally, no evidence was found that debt defaults affect PII. 
                                                       
5 This is so because the variable in the regression is the change in the default dummy variable.    14
The positive effect of public debt on PII found in this paper may stem from a 
combination of economic, political and institutional factors that deserve greater attention before 
any policy recommendations can be advanced. Economic considerations may justify giving 
infrastructure expenditure higher priority than other types, such as social expenditure, in the face 
of rising debt stocks, because PII may generate higher economic and fiscal returns (at least in the 
short to medium run) and because delays in infrastructure projects often carry heavy costs. 
Politically, public infrastructure projects are more visible and more easily accepted as an 
adequate use of finance, and this bias is even enshrined in the legal system of many countries, 
where debt issuance is restricted to physical investment projects. These factors create a dynamic 
whereby PII increases like any other expenditure during periods when no debt is incurred but 
tends to increase even further when expenditure increases lead to indebtedness. This is consistent 
with the observed vulnerability of PII during periods of fiscal retrenchment with debt reduction. 
   15
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru































Public Debt 47 0.378 0.164 0.125 0.724 -2.00 -3.13
** -1.95 -1.99 -0.24 -4.23
*** -2.59

















Primary Expenditure 46 0.167 0.054 0.091 0.297 -5.08
***
-2.33 -3.46
** -1.92 -1.85 -3.19
** -4.36
***


















































































* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Unit root tests on first difference of each series.
Unit Root Test (Dickey Fuller) - t statistics
Note: All variables, except log GDP per capita, real exchange rate, 
inflation and default dummy are shares of GDP.















































































































































































































































































































Total Investment in Infrastructure 1
Public Investment in Infrastructure 0.866 1
Private Investment in Infrastructure 0.910 0.580 1
Log GDP per capita -0.631 -0.570 -0.555 1
Public Debt 0.092 0.184 -0.002 -0.625 1
Fiscal Balance -0.174 -0.407 0.054 0.238 -0.380 1
Debt Service -0.269 0.129 -0.545 0.092 0.413 -0.650 1
Primary Expenditure 0.780 0.467 0.882 -0.672 0.193 -0.107 -0.449 1
Total Revenues 0.663 0.393 0.754 -0.565 0.196 -0.012 -0.267 0.897 1
Primary Balance -0.445 -0.325 -0.454 0.322 0.117 0.272 0.415 -0.494 -0.125 1
Official Debt 0.595 0.445 0.600 -0.922 0.718 -0.213 -0.162 0.718 0.578 -0.322 1
Multilateral Debt 0.676 0.540 0.652 -0.858 0.666 -0.278 -0.135 0.755 0.622 -0.309 0.954 1
IMF Debt -0.095 -0.042 -0.120 -0.334 0.738 -0.171 0.290 -0.019 0.002 0.319 0.451 0.458 1
Bilateral Debt 0.413 0.265 0.453 -0.881 0.688 -0.101 -0.176 0.574 0.444 -0.296 0.924 0.768 0.382 1
Default -0.030 0.133 -0.159 -0.231 0.578 -0.247 0.526 -0.126 0.030 0.382 0.226 0.139 0.411 0.307 1
Privatizations 0.257 0.117 0.321 -0.313 0.074 0.042 -0.196 0.327 0.307 -0.202 0.291 0.172 -0.069 0.404 0.223 1
Real Exchange Rate -0.277 -0.022 -0.433 0.106 0.290 -0.452 0.732 -0.366 -0.261 0.358 -0.152 -0.094 0.330 -0.204 0.260 -0.371 1
Inflation -0.139 0.216 -0.406 0.050 0.322 -0.524 0.872 -0.372 -0.193 0.424 -0.160 -0.123 0.315 -0.187 0.416 -0.173 0.759
Note: All variables, except log GDP per capita, real exchange rate, inflation and default dummy are shares of GDP.






Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of GDP, lagged) 0.045 -0.009 0.4445 0.2391 0.2443 0.2173
(0.299)  (0.061)  (4.349)  
*** (2.282)  
** (2.028)  
** (1.906)  
*
Public Debt (share of GDP, lagged) 0.0138 0.0133 0.0163 0.0108 0.0041 0.0064
(1.946)  
* (1.946)  
* (2.654)  
*** (1.909)  
* (0.570)  (0.854)  
Fiscal balance (share of GDP) -0.0278 -0.0449
(1.101)  (3.422)  
***
Debt service (share of GDP) 0.0691 0.0595
(2.890)  
*** (2.533)  
**
Primary expenditure (share of GDP) 0.0653
(1.649)  
*
Total Revenues (share of GDP) -0.0316
(0.627)  
Primary balance (share of GDP) -0.0233
(0.999)  
Constant -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0011
(0.401)  (0.514)  (4.255)  
*** (5.504)  
*** (4.052)  
*** (4.578)  
***
Observations 47 46 47 46 47 45
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 7 7 7777
Sargan test (prob > chi
2) 57.97 53.55 54.37 48.76
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include as controls logarithms of GDP (per capita) and GDP per capita squared.
All estimators are in first differences.
Table 3. Public Investment in Infrastructure, Share of GDP
OLS fixed effects Arellano Bond
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Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of primary expenditure) 1 2 3 4
Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of primary expenditure, lagged) 0.394 0.3252 0.2401 0.2419
(3.814)  
*** (3.157)  
*** (2.040)  
** (2.126)  
**
Public Debt (share of GDP, lagged) 0.1832 0.1526 0.0924 0.0875
(3.691)  
*** (3.097)  
*** (1.625)   (1.496)  
Fiscal Balance (share of GDP) -0.2626
(2.721)  
***
Debt service (share of GDP) 0.5048 0.5376
(2.964)  
*** (3.123)  
***
Primary expenditure (share of GDP) -0.2371
(0.723)  
Total Revenues (share of GDP) -0.459
(1.142)  
Primary balance (share of GDP) 0.0682
(0.362)  
Constant -0.0096 -0.0095 -0.0081 -0.0081
(5.192)  
*** (5.321)  
*** (4.365)  
*** (4.269)  
***
Observations 43 43 43 43
Number of countries 6666
Sargan test (prob > chi
2) 42.52 38.11 36.69 37.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include as controls logarithms of GDP (per capita) and GDP per capita squared.
All estimators are Arellando Bond in first differences.




Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of GDP) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of GDP, lagged) 0.2391 0.2391 0.2417 0.2429 0.155 0.1413
(2.2821)   
** (2.2555)   
** (2.2536)   
** (2.3058)   
** (1.3794)    (1.1406)     
Public Debt (share of GDP, lagged) 0.0108 0.0107 0.0128 0.0093 0.0169 0.0208
(1.9087)   
* (1.8846)   
* (2.1496)   
** (1.4530)    (2.6085)   
*** (2.4219)     
**
Fiscal Balance (share of GDP) -0.0449 -0.045 -0.0232 -0.0386 -0.0524 -0.0339
(3.4217)   
*** (3.2902)   
*** (1.1148)    (2.0941)   
** (3.8969)   
*** (1.3745)     
Privatizations (share of GDP) 0.0015 -0.0195
(0.0445)    (0.5002)     
Real exchange rate 0.000028 0.000028
(1.3691)    (1.2786)     
Inflation 0.000016 -0.0000092
(0.4844)    (0.2514)     
Private investment in infrastructure (share of GDP) 0.1457 0.1688
(1.7826)   
* (1.7389)     
*
Constant -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012
(5.5040)   
*** (5.1722)   
*** (5.2318)   
*** (4.7661)   
*** (5.8317)   
*** (4.8332)     
***
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 77777 7
Sargan test (prob > chi
2) 53.55 52.29 49.25 53.03 53.32 44.59
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include as controls logarithms of GDP (per capita) and GDP per capita squared.
All estimators are Arellando Bond in first differences.
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Public Investment in Infrastructure
12 34
Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of GDP, lagged) 0.2159 0.186
(2.0247)   
** (1.6673)   
*
Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of primary expenditure, lagged) 0.2983 0.2642
(2.7860)   
*** (2.3469)   
**
Fiscal balance (share of GDP) -0.0385 -0.0418 -0.2228 -0.2322
(2.6740)   
*** (2.7688)   
*** (2.0650)   
** (2.0538)   
**
Public Debt (share of GDP, lagged) 0.0126 0.0129 0.1688 0.171
(2.1465)   
** (2.0236)   
** (3.1995)   
*** (3.0690)   
***
Official Debt (share of GDP, lagged) -0.0161 -0.0987
(1.0680)    (0.7724)   
Multilateral debt (share of GDP, lagged) 0.0305 0.2701
(1.0258)    (1.1348)   
IMF debt (share of GDP, lagged) -0.1004 -0.5949
(1.7271)   
* (1.2696)   
Bilateral debt (share of GDP, lagged) -0.0086 -0.093
(0.4661)    (0.5808)   
Constant -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0099 -0.0111
(5.6229)   
*** (5.3771)   
*** (5.4272)   
*** (5.3758)   
***
Observations 46 46 43 43
Number of countries 77 66
Sargan test (prob > chi
2) 52.79 44.53 36.86 32.27
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include as controls logarithms of GDP (per capita) and GDP per capita squared.
All estimators are Arellando Bond in first differences.
Table 6. Public Investment in Infrastructure and Multilateral Debt
Share of GDP





Public Investment in Infrastructure
12 34
Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of GDP, lagged) 0.2464 0.2355
(2.2496)   
** (2.1192)   
**
Public Investment in Infrastructure (share of primary expenditure, lagged) 0.3246 0.3246
(3.1067)   
*** (3.0592)   
***
Fiscal balance (share of GDP) -0.0429 -0.0518 -0.2684 -0.269
(3.0614)   
*** (3.1908)   
*** (2.6855)   
*** (2.3102)   
**
Public Debt (share of GDP, lagged) 0.0119 0.0181 0.136 0.1365
(1.7614)   
* (2.0610)   
** (2.1930)   
** (1.7908)   
*
Default 0.0029 0.009 -0.021 -0.0206
(0.6420)    (1.2691)    (0.5348)    (0.3466)   
Default*Public debt -0.0053 -0.0138 0.0413 0.0407
(0.5999)    (1.1787)    (0.5325)    (0.4086)   
Default*Offiicial debt 0.0053 0.0004
(1.1223)    (0.0108)   
Constant -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0096 -0.0096
(4.9626)   
*** (5.0263)   
*** (5.0963)   
*** (5.0078)   
***
Observations 46 46 43 43
Number of countries 77 66
Sargan test (prob > chi
2) 49.28 46.95 36.84 35.76
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include as controls logarithms of GDP (per capita) and GDP per capita squared.
All estimators are Arellando Bond in first differences.
Share of GDP
Share of primary 
expenditure
Table 7. Public Investment in Infrastructure and Defaults